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Labor contracts are a way of sharingidiosyncraticproductionrisksbetween entrepreneursand
workers,especiallywhensuchrisksaretoocomplexforcontingentcontractstobewrittenonthem.
So it is important to understand how equilibrium employment and wages are affected by risk re-
lated factors, such as risk aversion of entrepreneurs and workers, risk sharing opportunitiesin the
economy etc. The paper develops a general equilibriummodel with several sectors of production
which are subject to idiosyncratic productivityshocks, two inputs - labor and capital - and stock
markets which diversify sectoral risks but not completely. We prove the existence of equilibrium
forthisgeneralmodel. Themodelisthenparameterized byCRRAutilityfunctions. Weprovethat
the equilibriumemployment levels vary inversely with the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion of
agents under certain conditions. Numerical simulations show that over a range of the coefﬁcient
employment levels are higher when markets are complete than when they are not. A substantive
implication of the comparative static results is that a low paying, productivelyless efﬁcient alter-
native to workingfor private ﬁrms may be desirable as an insurance instrument.
￿Theauthorwishesto acknowledgeadeepdebtofgratitude to MichaelMagill andMartine Quinzii fortheir help andsug-
gestionsateverystageofthiswork. HelpfulcommentsfromFernandoZapatero,andsomeparticipantsattheNorthAmerican
Summer Meetings and the Latin American Meetings of the Econometric Society,1999, are also gratefully acknowledged.
11 Introduction
Economistsagree that labor contracts are a way of sharing idiosyncraticproductionrisks between en-
trepreneurs andworkers,especiallywhensuchrisksaretoocomplexforinsurancecontractstobewrit-
ten on them and traded in organized markets. It is therefore important to understand how (economy
wide)equilibriumemploymentandwagesareinﬂuencedbyriskrelatedfactors,inparticular,riskaver-
sionof entrepreneurs and workersand risk sharingopportunitieselsewherein the economy, such as in
the asset markets.
The paper develops a general equilibriummodel to address thisissue. The model has several sec-
torsofproductionwhichare subjecttoidiosyncraticproductivityshocks,twoinputs- laborandcapital
- andstockmarkets whichhelpdiversifysectoralrisksalthoughnotcompletely. We ﬁrst provethe ex-
istence of equilibriumfor thisgeneral model. Havingparameterized the model by CRRA utilityfunc-
tions, we then prove that under certain conditions, the equilibrium employment levels vary inversely
with the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion of agents - a non obvious result in a general model with
many riskyassetsof whichlabor isone.
1 The methodthat isproposedto provethisresultis easilyex-
tendible to other types of utilityfunctions from the HARA class, for which closed form solutionsfor
demand functions are easy to ﬁnd. We choose to present the result only for the CRRA type because
of its wide applicability in Macroeconomics and Finance. We then compare results from numerical
simulations of this parameterized model and those from a comparable benchmark model in which a
complete set of Arrow securitiesare traded. It is seen that over a range of the risk aversion parameter,
employment levels are higher when markets are complete. An explanationis provided for this.
The above results have a practical implication which may be regarded as one of the substantive
motivationbehindthispaper. Workers inthismodelhave an outsidealternativetoworkingfor private
entrepreneurs. This option is productively less efﬁcient from the macro point of view and pays less
than the latter. As the relativerisk aversiongoes upso does the use of thisoption. Also, over a certain
range oftheriskparameter, thisoptionislessattractivewhenmarkets are completethanwhentheyare
not. The paper thusdescribes a role for a productivelyinefﬁcient, low paying activityas an insurance
1In fact the theorem cannotbe proved to be true for another risky asset,namely physicalcapital.
2instrument.
Onecanthinkofmanyexamplesofsuchoutsideoptionsinrealeconomies. Withinthecontextofa
developing economy, for example, householdproduction(cottage industry)or self cultivationof land
withthehelpoffamilylaborcanbesuchan alternativetowagelaborinthemanufacturingsector. Gov-
ernmentﬁnancedunemploymentdoles,indevelopedeconomiesalsoﬁtsthedescription. Athirdexam-
ple would be working in a less productive state owned ﬁrm in an erstwhile command/regulated econ-
omywhichistryingtoprivatize. Wechoosethelastexampletothinkoftheoutsideoptioninthispaper,
partly because of the current interest in privatization issues and partly because transition/deregulating
economies are good examples of incomplete insurance markets. Thus the paper supplements other
attempts
2 to explainthe slowpace of privatization
3 by providinga rationale for state enterprises from
a risk sharing point of view.
The Implicit Contract models were among the earliest attempts to point out the importance of la-
bor contracts as risk sharing devices (see Rosen (1998) for a survey of thisliterature). The absence of
asset markets however, make these essentiallypartial equilibriumapproaches to the issue. Some later
Real BusinessCycle models withcontractual labor (Boldrin and Horvath (1995), Gomme and Green-
wood (1995)) remove this limitation. However, the assumption of a representative agent and market
completeness simpliﬁes many of the problems associated withrisk sharing. The model in this paper is
closer in spirit to Dreze’s (1991) CAPM model with labor contracts. The CAPM assumption, which
for the purposes of this paper is restrictive, is removed and laborers are assumed to have sector spe-
ciﬁc skills (unlike in Dreze) which make them suitable for employment in only one sector at a time.
We consider speciﬁcity of labor to be a more reasonable assumption as it explains why labor may be
subject to idiosyncratic risks in the ﬁrst place.
Inthemodelbelowthereareseveralproductiveactivitiesproducingthesamegood(income)which
we call sectors. Sectors differ from each other in their risk proﬁles only. State ﬁrms have historically
organized production up to the point at which our story starts. To increase productive efﬁciency the
2see Arabadjiev (1999) for a survey. Some other explanations are job search costs (Atkeson and Kehoe, 1996), training
costs (Arabadjiev,1999), political compromises (Dewatripont and Roland, (1992), Fernandezand Rodrik (1991)etc.
3see Ramamurti and Vernon (1991), Cook and Kirkpatrick (1988), and Commander and Coricelli (1995) for evidence
which suggest that the public - private balance has not been dramatically altered in favor of the private in most of these
economies,particularly in large scale manufacturing sectors.
3government allows risk averse private entrepreneurs to organize production. State ﬁrms continue to
act as extensions of a benevolent government and employ the residual labor supply not working for
private ﬁrms. There are positive costs of working for private ﬁrms (because of retraining to acquire
more skills or maybe because households have to work harder) and zero costs of working for state
ﬁrms.
Workersandprivateentrepreneurshavesectorspeciﬁcskillswhichexposethemtosectoralshocks.
The extent to which these risks can be shared through the wage contract depends on the labor market
structure. Two extreme scenarios may be potentially considered - (i) Competitive under which there
areinnumerableworkersandprivateentrepreneursineachsector. Competitionamongﬁrmsandwork-
ers ensure that wages are equal to marginal product in each state of Nature in equilibrium (Section 2
explains how this may be achieved under incomplete markets). Both parties are exposed to sectoral
risks in equal measure under this scenario. (ii) Monopsonist under which there is one private ﬁrm in
each sector. Theﬁrmacts as thewageleaderby takingtheworker’soptimallaborsupplyresponseinto
account to decide on the optimal wage contract. In this paper as a ﬁrst cut and as mathematically the
more tractable case, the competitive structure is assumed (for a discussion of the other structure see
Roy (1999)).
State ﬁrms by contrast to private ﬁrms always pay their employees an average output (averaged
across sectors) per worker in each state. State employees are thus protected against sectoral but not
aggregateshocks. Sectoralshockscanbepartiallydiversiﬁedbytradingintheﬁnancialmarketswhich
are not complete. The model belowis thatof a stock market economy withequitiesas the only assets.
The number of equities (sectors) is less than the number of states, which make asset markets incom-
plete.
Section 2 lays down the details of the model. Section 3 proves the existence of an equilibrium.
Provingexistenceof an equilibriumina productionmodel withincompletemarkets isdifﬁcultingen-
eral because the market subspacemay be inﬂuenced by the action of the agents. In this, we are helped
by the competitive assumption for labor markets. The concept of a no-arbitrage equilibrium (NAE)
commoninexchangebasedﬁnancemodels
4 isextendedforaproductioneconomytorewritetheStock
4See Magill and Quinzii (1996) for a comprehensivediscussion.
4Market EquilibriumasaconstrainedArrow-DebreuEquilibrium. ThemethodofDebreu(1959)isthen
adapted to prove existence. The comparative statics results in section 4.1 are proved usingthe mono-
tonicitypropertiesoftheﬁrstorderconditionsofagentsandtheﬁxedpointtechnique-anadaptationof
a methodologynow well known in the literature, followingthe work of Milgrom and Roberts (1994),
Milgrom andShannon(1994), VillasBoas (1997)andothers. FinallyinSection4.2 wereportthesim-
ulation results on employment under incomplete vis.a vis. complete markets and conclude.
2 The Model
There are two periods 0 and 1, and








each sector is organized by state and privately owned ﬁrms. Production decisions (i.e. employment
and investment decisions) are made at date 0. The actual production takes place at date 1. At date 1,
Nature subjects each sector





s. All sectors produce








g. Shocks are multiplicative.































k stand for labor and capital.
Private and government ﬁrms in any sector are subject to the same productivity shocks but have
different state independent production functions. In particular government ﬁrms operate with an ex-
ogenous and historicallygiven stock of capital.

















































; Both inputs are essential.
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Note that no concavity/convexity assumption is made about
g
j at this stage. Such assumptions
will be made in Section 4 when they become necessary to prove the comparative static results. The
model is interestingonly when for
k
j above a critical minimum, the level of outputin private ﬁrms is
sufﬁciently higher than that in state ﬁrms given the same employment levels in both such that private
ﬁrms are ableto paytheirworkersmore thanthe stateﬁrms inequilibrium. Tworeasonssuggestedfor
the lower productivity of workers in state ﬁrms and assumed in the model are - ﬁrstly, the state ﬁrms
operate with a ﬁxed and outdated capitalstock, and secondly, workers in state ﬁrms lack incentivesto
put in qualityeffort because of a free rider problem involved in the government wage contract. So,
Assumption 2 There exists
k
c
























































ship are sector speciﬁc, which means that each householdhas the skillsto workand each entrepreneur
the leadership to organize production in one sector only. There are however numerous identical en-
trepreneurs and households in each sector
j. With regard to labor and stock markets, this implies that
entrepreneurs and households perceive their private actions as not inﬂuencing the market wage rates
or the security pay-off structures. In other words they make private decisions taking the market wage
contracts and the market subspace as given. The households and entrepreneurs are said to be having
competitivepriceperceptionsinboththelaborandstockmarkets whenthisisthe case (seeMagilland
Quinzii, 1996).
Entrepreneurs maximize expected utility as consumers and total dividends (output minus costs)









Introducing a bond into the model does not change any of the results qualitatively. We shall however



















agents do not perceive this as causing the market subspace to change and hence their date 1 income
streams from securities(in particularfrom the share of the
jth representativeﬁrm) to be affected. One
way to explain this is to think that a household or an entrepreneur in buying a share of the
jth repre-
sentative ﬁrm is actually investing the amount on the income stream offered by the industry. He can
always change his portfolio for the numerous ﬁrms within the industry to take care of any changes in
the dividend stream offered by a singleﬁrm withoutchanging his portfolio for the industry.
Let









sth row of the matrix. Under a competitive market structure in sector
j the representative ﬁrm
makes zero proﬁts in equilibrium. This means that output net of wage costs are paid out as dividends
to the shareholders by way of return on capital invested in the ﬁrm. Another way to think about this
is that the ﬁrm’s budget constraint (revenue
￿ wage costs
+ dividends) must bind in equilibrium. It















































1 the vector of private wage con-










) i.e. the dividend streams depend on the actions cho-














































1. We shall choose either representation according as whichever is more convenient.
Wearenowreadytodiscusstheoptimalprogramsoftherepresentativehouseholdandentrepreneur.














j (whichhe makes as a producer), the
jth representativeentrepreneur













































































































































































































jth entrepreneur’s vector of personal valuations of
income streams - i.e. his present value vector. Assuming the wage contract
W
j, the security prices
Q, and the market subspace or
<
V






































as a producer. Sinceentrepreneursare initialownersof theirﬁrms, productionprojectsare eval-
uated using their personal valuationvectors.

































subject to Equation2, as a consumer.
Since labor issector speciﬁc, the index




the private and the government ﬁrms. Working for a government ﬁrm is costless and working for a
privateﬁrm iscostlyforthelaborer,eitherbecausetheyhavetoinvesttoacquiremoreskillsorbecause










































certain relevant sets are bounded, in Section 3 where we discuss the existence of equilibrium.
8Sinceitiscostlessfor householdstoworkforstateﬁrms, itisoptimalforthemtosupplyanyresid-









































































































































































































































































subject to Equation 3.
We need to discussthe characteristics of the competitiveequilibrium labor contracts at this point.
There isnoenforcement mechanismfor theprivatewagecontractsinthemodel. Thismeans thatthere
is no penalty for the householdsor ﬁrms to renege on a wage contract at date 1. Since there are many
ﬁrms ineach sector, itisthereforepossibleforaworkerinsector
j tojoinoneﬁrmat date0and leaveit
to work for anotherat date 1 for a higherwage. Similarlya ﬁrm can attract workersfrom a competitor
by payinghigherwagesat date1. It isclear thatincentivestorenege ona contract drawnat date 0will




j must therefore offer the same wage contract to any worker in this sector. Of the set
9of proﬁt maximizing wage contracts, under the competitive assumption, there is only one which is
robust with respect to parties reneging on their date 0 contracts in this sense. We argue in Section 3.2
that thisis also the equilibriumwage contract which is robustwith respect to opening of spot markets
although in our model there are no spot markets for labor.
There are no enforcement problems with the state wage contracts. Wages paid to the employees
are the onlyexpenses ofthe governmentand therevenue from thestate ﬁrms itsonlyincome. In equi-
libriumthetwomustbalance. Weassume thattheGovernmentisinterestedinmaximizingthewelfare
of its employees all of whom are given the same weights in its objective function. So the government
ﬁrms distribute the total revenue that is generated from all their activities equally among all the em-


























































































































portfolioplans of householdsand entrepreneurs, private and state wage contracts, dividends and se-
curity prices such that,

















































































































































103. At date 1, workers and entrepreneurshave no incentives to switch partieswith whom they have
drawn contractsat date 0.
4. Firms in each sector














































































3 Existence of the Stock Market Equilibrium
To prove the existence of a SME we proceed along the following steps.
We ﬁrst deﬁne inSection3.1 the conceptof a normalizedNo-ArbitrageEquilibrium(NAE) which
is a constrained Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium. By this is meant that under this equilibrium the agents
are allowed to trade in a complete set of contingent goods as in an Arrow-Debreu set up. But all of
them exceptingoneare allowedto trade onlythosecommoditybundleswhichlie on a subspaceof the
whole commodity space. This concept, which has been used before to prove existence of equilibrium
in exchange based ﬁnancial models (see Magill and Quinzii (1996)) needs some explanation. When
there are no arbitrageopportunitiesin ﬁnancial markets, securityprices inequilibriumare equal tothe
presentvalueoftheirincomestreams. Whenmarketsareincompletethepresentvaluevectorsofagents
generally differ in equilibrium. However they are unanimousin their evaluationof the income stream
of a marketed security. Thusthe present value vector of any agent at hisequilibriumconsumptioncan




￿ and security prices
Q, from the




11state prices whichcan be chosen tobe the present value vector of any agentin equilibrium. The Stock
Market Equilibrium looks very much like a Contingent Market Equilibrium with these substitutions.
However, as we pointedout, the present value vector of any agent can be chosento represent the state
pricevectorunderthisequilibrium. Andsoequilibriumstatepricesarenotuniquelydeﬁned. Theusual
convention in the literature is to normalize state prices in equilibrium by choosing agent 1’s present
value vector to be the equilibrium state price vector. His budget set then becomes an unconstrained
Arrow-Debreu budget set.
Section 3.1 adapts the concept of the normalized NAE to a production model with labor. Section
3.2provestheexistenceofaNAEforourmodel. TheninSection3.3weshowthataSMEisequivalent
to a normalized NAE thus deﬁned. Hence as a normalized NAE exists, so does a SME.


















































the present value vector of household






j the date 1 consumption
















We can use these equations to eliminate the security prices from the the budget constraints of the





















































































The date 0 budget constraintin the above expressionis the Arrow-Debreu contingentmarket bud-
get set. Since the
jth household is free to choose any portfolio (short sales are allowed) the date 1
constraintsmerely implythatthe “net trade” vector(demand minus endowmentsminus earningsfrom
12production) must lie in the market subspace
<
V
>. Thus the date 1 budgetconstraintsof the house-
holdscan be writtenwithoutany explicitreference tothe portfoliovariables
￿
j and the NA budget set
for household


































































































































budget set for the































































































It istobe notedat thispointthatin exchangebased ﬁnancialmodels
<
V












S ,the no-arbitrageprice equations5cannotuniquely
solve for the state price vector given the equilibrium security prices. There are thus in general many
state price vectors associated witha no-arbitrage equilibriumallocation.
6 To uniquelydeﬁne the state
prices in equilibrium we shall follow the usual conventionand choose the present-value vector of the
ﬁrsthouseholdinequilibriumtorepresentthem. Thisassumptionconvertstheﬁrsthousehold’sbudget
set into a non-constrained Arrow-Debreu budget set. The deﬁnition of this normalized No-Arbitrage




































) of consumptionand labor supply plans of entrepreneurs and households, production
































































































































































































































5. At date 1, workers and entrepreneurshave no incentives to switch partieswith whom they have
drawn contractsat date 0.
6. Firms in each sector





























































































































It shouldbe noted that inPart 4 of Deﬁnition2 we use state prices rather than the personal present
valuevectorofentrepreneur
j todeﬁnetheproﬁtfunctionofhisﬁrm. Weshowinthesubsectionbelow











) belongsto the market subspace in equilibrium.
143.2 Existence of a normalized NAE






g denote the set of state price vectors.
Since utility functions are strictly concave and the NAE budget set of household 1 is convex, the





























































































































gare constrained Arrow-Debreu and is the
intersectionof the unconstrainedbudget set and
<
V
> which is given to the individualagents under
competitive price perceptions. The constrainedbudget set is thus an intersection of the unconstrained





+ and hence is convex. Thus the demand and






























































































































G and the dividend streams
V
j.
Given his optimal choice of
k
j, the entrepreneur






















































































proﬁt maximizationprogram yieldstheoptimalcapital/laborratio andtheﬁrst order conditionthatthe






















































As deﬁned, the NAE wage contract must be such that parties to it must not have the incentive
to switch at date 1. We now claim that the only contract which maximizes net earnings for any en-
trepreneur in sector
















It is easy to seethat ifall ﬁrms in sector
j paythistherewillbe noincentiveseitherforthe workers
or fortheﬁrms towithdrawfrom anexistingcontract. Tounderstandwhythisistheonlycontract with
this feature, note ﬁrstly that all ﬁrms in sector
j must pay the same contract so that the incentives to
withdrawdonotexist. Combinethiswiththefeatureofcompetitivemarketswhichallowforfree entry
and exit of ﬁrms and householdsand our claim is true.





































Equation 10 yields the optimal wage contract as a continuous function of the capital/labor ratio
employed by the ﬁrm

































































) is a scaler, under competitive assumptionsand optimal behavior of entrepreneurs. Also
note that
￿









































































j. Hence to deﬁne the proﬁt function of the representativeﬁrm in sector
j, (in Deﬁnition2),
using state prices or using the personal present value vector of the entrepreneur
j are equivalent.






















































































































































































































































































































































TheexcessdemandfunctionsdeﬁnedabovesatisﬁesWalras’Law. Thereare ineffect fourtypesof
“agents” in the stock market economy whose budget constraintsmust be satisﬁed given their optimal
choices, even when the economy is not in equilibrium. These are the workers, the entrepreneurs, the
government and the ﬁrms. Thus so longas the government has a balanced budgetEquation4 must be
true for any





















































































since capital and state prices are always assumed to be non-negativein our model.
To prove the existence of a NAE, we shall work with a reduced form of the system described by




k from the set. The

















































Since the budget sets of the agents are invariant with respect to a scaler multiple of
￿, the excess





























Pis compact and convex.



























j. Thus productionfunctionsforeach sector is boundedabovewhich places a lowerboundon excess





































and deﬁned the equilibriumon the set of prices
￿ only. However for the comparative statics proposi-






convenient tool. Because employment levels appear explicitlyinthe ﬁxed pointvectorunder thisrep-
resentation, we are able to derive comparative staticsof employment levels across different equilibria
by comparing the ﬁxed point vectors directly.
Proposition 1 There exists a normalizedNAE for the stock market economy.
Proof:



























































































































) . It is straightforwardto show that thisis an equilibrium(see Varian).
In particular, if consumptionin every state is desirablethe equilibrium is interior in
￿.
￿
193.3 Equivalence of normalized NAE and SME
We need to prove that,






















































































































































































) is a SME.
Proof:
(i)NoteﬁrstthatunderaSME(fromtheﬁrstorderconditionsoftheentrepreneurs)theequilibrium
privatewage contract in sector

















































































1 and from the ﬁrst order conditions






































































































































































































































































































































































































































V . Then the


































V ,a n d
￿
￿
















































































































































































































































































































































































We are now ready to combine Proposition1 and Lemma 1 to prove the existence of a SME.
Proposition 2 A Stock Market Equilibrium(Deﬁnition1) exists.
Proof: Follows from Lemma 1 and Proposition1.
￿
4 Comparative Statics of Employment
4.1 Employment and Relative Risk Aversion
WhentheutilityfunctionisCRRA, thesolutionsof Equations21to 23are deﬁned for agiven valueof
￿, thecoefﬁcientofrelativeriskaversion. Inthissectionweaskthequestion-Areprivateemployment
levels inequilibriumadversely affected by a rise in
￿, assumingthatthe laborsupplyfunctionitselfis










)diminishes with respect to




G. In fact clear answers can be given only for special cases.
Section 4.1 (Propositions3, 4 and 5) discussesthese situations. Finally in Section 4.2 numerical sim-
ulations of the Stock Market and Benchmark (described below) economies with Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction functions are discussed. These show that for a certain range of
￿, private employment levels
are higher when markets are complete than when they are not. Although we are unable to prove this
result mathematically, an intuitionis provided.





























































































































The ﬁrst conditionis usuallysatisﬁed if
g
j’s are concave. It implies that state wages increase (or stay
constant) as the number of state employees decrease because there are fewer people to share the pie
with. The second inequality which is likely to be satisﬁed for sufﬁciently convex
g
j’s is however not
an implausible scenario either. Since state ﬁrms operate with historically ﬁxed capital stocks which
had absorbed the entire labor force tilldate 0, these ﬁrms are likely to have increasing returns to labor
over the range of availablelabor atdate 1. The secondinequalityrequiresthat themarginal productof
labor in each sector be sufﬁciently high (compared to the average of the average products) so that as
labor is transferred from stateﬁrms to privateﬁrms theper capita wages inthe former donot increase.




) is increasing in each
l
j.
We assume all the equilibriato be interior in
￿ and




































































































































The left hand side of the above equationsis the marginal value of the extra income that household
j makes from working for private rather than state ﬁrms. We denote this as VMG for short. The right
handsideisthemarginalcostoflaborsupplytoprivateﬁrms. Foran interiorequilibriumthetwomust







































































0 from the ﬁrst order conditions of
household





































Thus the ﬁrst order conditionsof all householdswithrespect to labor have the same form whether
they have constrained or unconstrained budget sets.
We next attempt to eliminate
m
j














j,g i v e n
￿ (see Appendix) provided the household
is unconstrained.F o rt h econstrained agents, since individualdemand functionsfor securities are not
deﬁned, it is not possible to eliminate the
￿
j terms from the expressions for
m
j
0. To proceed with the
comparativestatics,wethereforemakeuseof(withoutproving)thefollowingpropertyofanormalized
NAE (see Magill and Quinzii, 1996).











































































j as the unconstrainedagent.
Whatthisimpliesisthattheallocationsofa particularNAEareinvariantwithrespecttothechoice










) with respect to
￿
are also invariant with respect to the choice of the unconstrainedagent i.e. the results willnot change
depending on our choice of the normalizing agent. At an equilibrium, any agent can therefore be as-




0 (from Appendix), Equation 26 yields
l













































7This equality is true outside equilibrium, so long as ﬁrms are optimizing and labor markets are competitive
23m
j
0 is increasing in
l





































It may be convenientto refer toﬁgure 1 at thisstage. The intersectionof downwardslopingVMG






) as a function of
￿ and
G.




0 . From the foc of the en-
trepreneurs Equations8 to 13,
W
j




























) however behaves in a more complicated way.





s has three effects on
m
j







0.T h i s
is the usual positive substitution effect. (ii) Value of income in state
s is higher relative to value of
income at date 0. (iii) Real income at state




s to move up relativelyto
m
j














































































j.W eh a v e
two cases.


























































0. Then there are











0 and simplifying, the


























































































0, the magnitude and sign of the followingexpression determines the
sign of the derivative.
24Figure 1: Optimal labor supplyto private ﬁrms
MC
VMG








































































































































































































































) be a ﬁxed point of
 
2. We are now ready to prove the following
propositions.






















































































































































































































































































￿ for at least one strict inequality and “=” otherwise.
8If all agents have demand functions of the form given in Appendix 2, excess demand functions are independentof
G
which cancels out under aggregation. When markets are incomplete closed form solutions of demand functions for all but



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































) is increasing in
l






























































































) is increasing in
l











Proposition 3 implies that if excess demand functions satisfy the conditions above in the neigh-
borhood of an equilibrium, private employment levels in some sectors will locally decrease(increase)
as the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion increases(decreases). The condition imposed on the excess
demand functionsneed explanation.
REMARKS







































































s. Since income effects are strong
m
j




s for all agents. What the conditionre-










































































































The left hand side depends on the overall productivityof state ﬁrms and the marginal returns to labor
in these. The right hand side depends on the marginal productivity of labor in private ﬁrms and how





j is to changes in
relative state prices). The more productively efﬁcient the private ﬁrms are relative to state ﬁrms, the
less likely that this inequality will be satisﬁed. Hence the larger the number of sectors that will be
adversely affected by a rise in relative risk aversion.
The next propositiondescribes a situationin which substitutioneffects are stronger and the above

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We follow all the remaining steps and prove the proposition.
￿.
REMARKS
5. For the conditionsof Proposition4 to be satisﬁed we need a rise in
￿ to increase consumption







0), sufﬁciently. Appendix1 discusseswhen this
can be the case.
6. Itisnecessarybutnotsufﬁcientforthecomparativestaticsresultabovethatthefocofthehouse-




























). There are other risky
assetsin themodel suchas
k
j forwhichthismonotonicitypropertycannotbe shown. Themonotonic-
ity property for labor supply can be easily shown to be true in this model because utilityfunctions are
separable in income and labor. The rise in the rate of relative risk aversion affects the marginal utility
of income but not the marginal disutility or costs of labor. Separability however is not necessary for
this property. What we need for the monotonicity property to hold, is that the coefﬁcient of relative
risk aversion affect marginal utilityof income more than the marginal disutilityof labor.
7. As we pointed out in the introduction, the above method of deriving the comparative static re-
sultscanbeeasilyextendedtoothertypesofutilityfunctionsintheHARAclass,forwhichclosedform
solutionsforthedemandfunctionscanbefound. We needtoknowthelattertocheckfor monotonicity
properties of the relevant functions.
294.2 Employment and Market Incompleteness
A benchmark economy
Stock markets are a way of sharing idiosyncratic production risks when such risks are too com-
plex for agents to write and exchange contingent contracts on these. It is however useful to compare
such an economy with an idealized one in which a complete set of such contracts are traded. In such
an economy entrepreneurs have no incentives to sell ownership shares of their ﬁrms and so are sole
proprietors. We end this section by formally deﬁning the equilibrium for this benchmark economy in
which a complete set of Arrow securities are traded.











































































































of Arrow securities purchased.
































































































































































of households,productionplansof entrepreneurs,portfoliosof householdsand entrepreneurs,private
and state wage contractsand state prices, such that:














































































































































3. At date 1, workers and entrepreneurshave no incentives to switch partieswith whom they have
drawn contractsat date 0.












































Section 3 shows that a SME is a constrained Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, because the budget sets
of the agents can be converted into constrained Arrow-Debreu budget sets. By contrast, those in the
Benchmark model are unconstrainedArrow-Debreu budget sets. Thus theﬁrst order conditionsinthe
two models, particularlyfor theemploymentlevels, are notdirectlycomparable ina way that was pos-
sible in the previous section. It is possible however to get some general intuition about the relative
employment levels in the two economies on the basis of some numerical examples.
A numerical example
Weconsidera modelwith5statesofNaturewhichare equiprobableandtwosectorsofproduction,
hence 2 householdsand 2 entrepreneurs. There are effectively 4 “assets” for each household - 2 equi-
ties, labor for private ﬁrms and labor for state ﬁrms. The “degree” of market incompleteness (no. of
assetsrelativetono. ofstatesofNature) isthusnotverysevere for households. (Howwoulda riskless
bond change things?)









j . Both sectors have identi-



















wages are less than private wages in every state.
31The linearity of the cost function of labor keeps the model simple for the purpose of getting nu-
merical solutions. This leads to a problem however since our model allowsfor short sales in equities.
As wages and dividend streams for any ﬁrm are collinear in equilibrium (both are scaler multiples of







j - end up having very similar payoff structures. If we allow for short sales in the numerical ex-
amples below, each of the householdsend up shortsellingover 30% of the ﬁrms that they work for, in







shareholders at date 1 from its labor earnings. Short sales of thismagnitude isclearly not realistic. To
keep the model simple for numerical solutionsand at the same time meaningful, we therefore impose
a no short sales restriction in equilibrium. Since the whole point of this section is to form some idea































Qualitatively, there are 4 levels of shocks - 6 represents very high, 4 high, 2 medium and 1 very low.
Thussector1hashighervariabilityandmeaninproductivitycomparedtosector2. Thesectoralshocks
are negativelycorrelated. Aggregaterisk (measured by standarddeviationof aggregate production)is
less than the sum of individualsectoral risks. This allows equities in the Stock Market model and the
Arrow securities in the Benchmark model to perform well in hedging sectoral risks. An alternative
scenario is discussedbelow (Table 2) in which the shockpattern of sector 2 is altered to yieldpositive
correlation between sectors. Both equities and Arrow-securities perform less well in hedging. As we
shall see gains from market completion are also lower over the relevant range.
Lastly,the riskaversioncoefﬁcients are chosenkeepinginmind theusualconventionsinthe RBC
literature.
Observationsand Explanations













































0.8 0.81 0.84 31 46 96 119 198 256
0.9 0.51 0.53 26 40 117 145 150 194
1.0 0.33 0.34 24 35 143 177 119 152
1.1 0.22 0.23 23 33 175 216 99 124
1.3 0.11 0.11 22 30 258 317 73 88













































0.8 0.50 0.65 15 32 39 51 48 82
0.9 0.36 0.45 17 31 50 62 45 70
1.0 0.26 0.31 18 30 63 77 41 60
1.1 0.19 0.22 19 30 80 95 37 52
1.3 0.10 0.11 22 32 126 145 32 41
1.6 0.04 0.05 28 36 242 268 26 31

































































) = standard deviation of aggregate output under
CME.


























0.8 0.91 0.91 0.45 0.55 34 52 12 25
0.9 0.57 0.56 0.36 0.40 28 44 14 26
1.0 0.38 0.36 0.27 0.29 25 39 16 27
1.1 0.26 0.24 0.20 0.21 24 35 17 28
1.3 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.11 23 32 21 31
1. CME employment levels are higher than SME employment levels only over a certain range of
the risk aversion parameter. Complete markets allow entrepreneurs and workers to diversify idiosyn-
cratic risks more (than is possible with incomplete markets) and hence has a positive effect on input
supply. However as the activity levels in individual sectors go up agents are also exposed to greater
risks (as shocks are multiplicative). These cannot be completely diversiﬁedaway even withcomplete
markets because of the presence of aggregate risks. There is thus a trade off between risk diversiﬁca-
tion and generation of additional risks in the Benchmark model. When risk aversion is not too high
the trade off is resolved in favor of higher employment in a CME.
2. For reasons explained in the previous paragraph the gains from market completion are higher
when shocks are negatively correlated than when they are positively so (aggregate risks increase by















so that shocks are positivelycorrelated. As we see, differences in employment levels are lower com-
pared to the previous case. Also the band over which these gains are positive is smaller.
Conclusion
The paper develops a general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets to discuss the inﬂu-
ence of two risk related factors on labor contracts - namely risk aversion and market incompleteness.
We have provedthe existenceof equilibriumfor thisgeneralmodel assumingcompetitionin the labor
market. The comparative statics of risk aversion has been proved analytically for CRRA utility and
34Cobb-Douglasproductionfunctions. As we pointedout, themethodshowncan beextendedrelatively
easily for many otherutilityfunctionsof the HARA class for which closedform solutionsfor demand
functions are available. The comparative statics of market incompleteness is difﬁcult to prove ana-
lytically because the ﬁrst order equations are not directly comparable. However an intuitionhas been
given for the numerical results. The model and main results of the paper has a practical implication.
Low paying, productivelyinefﬁcient outsideoptionsfor workers may be attractive from the risk shar-
ing point of view. The policyimplicationsof this observationhas not been explored in this paper and
is a subject for future research. The paper also does not address the economically more interesting
but mathematicallyless tractablecase(s) of non-competitivelabor markets. Anextreme example (and
therefore a ﬁrst cut) of a non-competitive situationis discussed in another paper (Roy, 1999).
5 Appendix
5.1
The foc of the













































































































































































































































































































































￿ or not (the signs of these are crucial for the comparative stat-
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￿
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0 reduces the denominator






1 , boththe numerator and the denominator
36move in the same direction, so the difference in the rate of increase of the two will determine the di-
rection. Thus the rate of growth of the numerator which is equal to state income in s relative to total
income, will determine whether
m
j
0 increases or not.
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